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ContentsThe U.S.stock market has recently recovered from lows experienced in the
aftermath of the bursting of the “new economy” bubble. Some investors
expect that the secular bear equity market is over and that the recent rally
heralds the beginning of a new bull market. According to this brief by
Philip Arestis and Elias Karakitsos,the rise in equity prices is temporary.It
is highly probable, they say, that the U.S. economy will experience a dou-
ble-dip recession as a result of a property market crash and asset and debt
deflation.
In an asset and debt deflation, the process of reducing debt by saving and
curtailing spending takes a long time, say the authors. Current imbalances
and poor prospects for spending in the private sector affect the balance
sheets of the commercial banks. The downward spiral between the banks
and the private sector induces a credit crunch that adversely affects the
U.S.economy,which is vulnerable to exogenous shocks and lacks the foun-
dations for a new, long-lasting business cycle.
According to the authors, the 2001 recession differed from all other reces-
sions of the post–World War II era since it was caused not by monetary
tightening, but by excessive inventories accumulated during the euphoria of
the new economy bubble. Lower interest rates have increased the lag
between an equity and property market crash, and have fueled a property
market bubble. A substantial fall in real personal disposable income will
ultimately trigger a collapse in property prices, they say, and the equity
markets have not priced in this event in combination with recession.
This brief analyzes how far equity prices could fall during the current asset
and debt deflation process. The authors use a macro and financial model
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Prefaceof the U.S.economy and three scenarios to estimate the effect of a double-
dip recession and a property market crash on the S&P 500 Index.Their most
likely scenario—a deep recession and a severe property market crash—
shows a 33-percent drop in equity prices within the next two years. Net
wealth as a percentage of personal disposable income declines significantly
and triggers a rise in the saving ratio, which deepens the recession as per-
sonal consumption dissipates. GDP, investment in equipment and soft-
ware,and corporate profits fall.Average price-earnings ratios and dividend
yields return to their long-term mean values. The U.S. dollar depreciates
30 percent from its mid 2002 value so that profits and corporate earnings
can recover.(Dollar depreciation of this magnitude is already well underway.)
The authors find that there are only three important factors that influence
the equilibrium value of the S&P 500: the exchange rate, industrial pro-
duction, and credit risk. Their analysis also finds that at the peak of the
new economy bubble, the S&P 500 was overvalued by 122 percent, but
three years of falling equity prices have essentially eliminated any overval-
uation. An overall sensitivity analysis shows that the equilibrium value of
the S&P 500 is approximately 600, plus or minus 10 percent. Using an
approach that emphasizes current and expected earnings as well as the
equity risk premium, the S&P 500 is estimated to be fairly valued at 901.
These values are significantly below the current level of the index.
This brief indicates that, contrary to investor expectations, equity markets
may move to much lower levels and the U.S.and world economies may not
have seen the worst yet, in terms of recession.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
July 2003
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U.S. equity prices have been falling since March 2000. In terms of magni-
tude, the current bear market resembles the mid-1970s plunge in equity
prices, but it differs in terms of causes and the factors that should be used
to monitor its progress. The 1970s bear market (a supply-led business
cycle) was the result of soaring inflation caused by a surge in oil prices that
eroded household real disposable income and corporate profits. Today’s
bear market, however, is caused by asset and debt deflation, which trig-
gered the bursting of the “new economy”bubble.
There have been three asset and debt deflation episodes that have led to
recession in the 19th and 20th centuries:1 the depression of 1876–90 (asso-
ciated with the railway bubble), the depression of 1929–40 (associated
with the electricity and automobile bubble), and deflation in Japan that
began in 1989 (associated with the electronics bubble) and has not yet
ended.In all three cases it took more than a decade to eliminate the serious
imbalances in the economy. As shown by the recent experience in Japan,
there are sharp, short-lived rallies in a secular bear market, giving rise to
false hopes that the bear market has ended. In an asset and debt deflation
environment, the nonbank private sector retrenches when the huge debt
acquired during the rosy years of rising asset prices is inconsistent with
falling asset prices. The process of reducing debt by saving and curtailing
spending is long and results in a secular bear equity market.This process of
asset and debt deflation,in this instance associated with the telecommuni-
cations and Internet bubble, is exactly what is happening today in the
United States.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Asset and Debt Deflation 
in the United StatesThe 2001 recession,which was the result of an inventory correction associ-
ated with the bursting of the new economy bubble, was very mild.
However, the U.S. economy could fall into a double-dip recession as the
poor prospects of the corporate component of the private sector affect the
real disposable income of the personal component of the private sector.
The forces that could drive the economy back into recession are related to
imbalances in the corporate and personal components that affect the bal-
ance sheets of the commercial banks. The final stage of the asset and debt
deflation process involves a spiral between the banks and the nonbank pri-
vate sector as banks cut lending and induce a credit crunch, thereby wors-
ening the economic health of the nonbank private sector, a factor which
further deteriorates the banks’balance sheets.
This brief examines how far U.S.equity prices could fall during the current
asset and debt deflation process. It begins by reviewing how equities are
valued and then discusses the impact that a double-dip recession and prop-
erty market crash could have on equilibrium equity prices as represented
by the S&P 500 Index.
Valuing Equities
Since the current bear market has its roots in asset and debt deflation, tra-
ditional methods of valuing equity markets based on supply-side factors
are inappropriate. The valuation method used in this brief, therefore, is
based on the degree of imbalance in the personal balance sheet (i.e., the
extent to which assets and liabilities or net wealth deviate from their means).
Net wealth is defined as assets (tangible and financial) less liabilities
(mainly mortgages and consumer credit).This definition of wealth has the
property of reverting to its mean, since it is a stationary variable.2
Figure 1 shows household net wealth as a percentage of personal dispos-
able income. Net wealth was higher than its mean in the golden years of
the 1950s and 1960s, when business cycles were led by demand, and lower
in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, when business cycles were led
by supply (e.g., the oil shocks of 1973–74 and 1979). Net wealth bottomed
at the end of 1974 at 413 percent of personal disposable income and did
not start to recover until mid 1984.From then on,however,net wealth rose
rapidly to 495 percent of personal disposable income, until the crash of
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Asset and Debt Deflation in the United States1987, which reduced net wealth to 469 percent of personal disposable
income.This loss was soon recouped,but the 1989 collapse in the property
market and the ensuing recession eroded net wealth to 466 percent of per-
sonal disposable income by the end of 1994. Thereafter, during the new
economy bubble, net wealth soared to 626 percent of personal disposable
income by the fourth quarter of 1999. The bubble burst in March 2000,
with the plunge of the Nasdaq, and net wealth fell to 491 percent of per-
sonal disposable income by the end of 2002. According to the Federal
Reserve’s flow of funds accounts (March 2003), the ratio of net wealth to
personal disposable income consists of equity (282 percent),property (186
percent), other net wealth (129 percent), and liabilities (minus 106 per-
cent). The dominance of equity in calculating net wealth is overwhelming.
The ratio of personal saving to personal disposable income, on a four-
quarter moving average basis, is also shown in Figure 1. This brief adopts
the thesis of Frowen and Karakitsos (1996), which states that the personal
component has a target real wealth in the long run that is consistent with
the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Savings. When asset prices rise more than
expected, households more easily meet their target real wealth and, there-
fore,r elax their effort to save. Consequently, saving, as a percent of per-
sonal disposable income, falls when real wealth rises more rapidly than
anticipated, and vice versa. Since asset prices move procyclically, this
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
















































































































Average household net wealth
Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’calculationsfeature implies a negative relationship between real wealth (expressed as a
percent of disposable income) and the saving ratio. Figure 1 strongly sup-
ports this view.
In this brief, the preferred method of valuing equities from a long-term
perspective is to determine corresponding values when net wealth returns
to its historical mean. This method assumes that the whole adjustment
process is borne by equities for any given level of personal disposable
income. Over time, however, as disposable income rises, the degree of fall
in equity prices that is required to restore net wealth to its mean dimin-
ishes. In other words, there is no need for a plunge in equity prices. Even
with level prices, imbalances will be eliminated over time and net wealth
will be restored to its mean value through a gradual rise in disposable
income. Unfortunately, equity prices never remain unchanged, since they
reflect expected developments in the real economy.Hence,an imbalance is
usually corrected with a fall in asset prices.
Using quarterly data from 1996 to 2002, Figure 2 shows the results of
applying the preceding valuation methodology to the S&P 500. The fair
value of the S&P 500 increases through time as disposable income rises.
However, the rate of increase in asset prices was much more rapid than the
Public Policy Brief 10
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Sources: Bloomberg.com, Karakitsos (2002), and authors’calculationsrate of increase in disposable income and this disparity resulted in a bub-
ble. At the peak of the bubble, in the fourth quarter of 1999, the S&P 500
was overvalued by 122 percent.3 Subsequently, in spite of three years of
falling equity prices, the S&P 500 was still overvalued by 9 percent at the
end of 2002, when its fair value is now estimated to have been 810.
Using daily rather than quarterly data, the S&P 500 was slightly underval-
ued on two occasions during the summer and autumn plunge in equity
prices in 2002. In the first quarter of 2003, the S&P 500 was again under-
valued as a result of the expected economic consequences of the Iraq war,
but it became slightly overvalued during the rally that followed the onset
of war. Does this rally herald the beginning of a new bull market? 
Consumer and business confidence may recover now that the Iraq war is
over. The accommodating stance of monetary policy and the proposed
retroactive fiscal package of the Bush administration may spur consumer
spending and business investment in the months ahead. But these govern-
ment policies may lead to only a short-lived cyclical recovery. Because of
imbalances in the private sector, which affect the balance sheets of the
commercial banks, the U.S. economy lacks the foundations for a new,
long-lasting business cycle. Hence, the economy is vulnerable to exoge-
nous shocks and could experience a double-dip recession.
The Case for Predicting a Double-Dip Recession and
Property Market Crash
Figure 3 shows the underlying forces behind the personal component
imbalance. Whereas the ratio of financial assets to personal disposable
income fell from 515 percent in March 2000 to 375 percent by the end of
2002 (almost three years after the bubble burst), debt continued to soar to
106 percent of personal disposable income. The discrepancy between
falling financial wealth and soaring debt is due to the widely held belief
that the fall in equity prices is temporary.This belief has been bolstered by
a rise in property prices that has cushioned the fall in equity prices.
The inevitable adjustment of debt to a sustainable level that is consistent
with current asset prices, and of saving to a level that represents a higher
proportion of disposable income, will be a long and painful retrenchment
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
How Far Can Equity Prices Fall?process. Figure 1 shows that the process whereby a higher saving ratio is
being triggered by lower net wealth has already started. Thus, retrench-
ment by the private sector could turn a double-dip recession into a pro-
tracted recession.The market has not yet discounted such a possibility—it
has simply postponed an economic recovery from the second half of 2002
to the first half of 2003 and, again, to the latter half of 2003.
Two avenues could return the economy to the path of asset and debt defla-
tion and a secular bear market:
1. The end of the war with Iraq may trigger a recovery of consumer and
business confidence,which,along with an easy fiscal and monetary policy,
may cause a cyclical upturn that could last as little as a few months or
until after the November 2004 presidential elections. If the cyclical
upturn is strong,people will assume the worst is over and that the econ-
omy is on a sustainable path to recovery. However, the stronger the
cyclical upturn, the more long-term interest rates will soar. This event
would trigger a collapse of the property market and the economy would
fall back into recession.
2.In spite of an end to the war,there is no cyclical upturn and the economy
continues to teeter on the edge of recession. Disappointment with the
lack of a recovery could trigger another collapse in equity prices and
Public Policy Brief 12
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Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’calculationsretrenchment by the private sector, which would also collapse the prop-
erty market.
Either avenue leads to the serious possibility of a recession combined with
a collapse in the property market. Whether earlier or later, the next reces-
sion will probably be much deeper than the last one.
Property prices recovered to 186 percent of disposable income between
1994 and 2002 (see Figure 4). If the forthcoming recession is deep, the like-
lihood of a substantial fall in property prices is very high.A fall in property
prices is usually caused by two factors: high and rising interest rates, and
low and falling growth in real personal disposable income.In most business
cycles, the former factor causes the latter. The central bank tightens mone-
tary policy to curb inflation and this action causes a recession that lowers
real disposable income. Higher interest rates make it more difficult for
households to service their debts,but households endure these higher costs
until their real disposable incomes begin to fall.An equity market crash,on
the other hand, occurs as soon as investors perceive that a rise in interest
rates will cause a recession. A property market crash lags one or two years
behind an equity market crash because it takes time for tight monetary pol-
icy to erode real personal disposable income. Moreover, the shift from
equity to property,after an equity market crash,contributes to the lag.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
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Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’calculationsFigure 4 shows that there has been a property market decline with every
recession. Small price declines were associated with the recessions of 1952
and 1958,and a significant decline was associated with the 1960s recession,
during which real estate fell 16 percentage points (from 149 percent to 133
percent of personal disposable income from December 1960 to March
1966).In the 1973–75 and 1980–82 recessions,real estate fell 9 and 14 per-
centage points, respectively. However, as a result of the 1990–91 recession,
real estate fell 22 percentage points (from 178 percent to 156 percent of
personal disposable income between the end of 1989 and December 1994).
This decline was significantly higher than the recession average of 13 per-
centage points.
The 2001 recession differs from all other recessions of the post–World War
II era in that it was caused not by monetary tightening but by excessive
inventories accumulated during the euphoria of the new economy bubble.
In fact, interest rates declined sharply. The U.S. monetary authorities did
not simply react to an inventory correction, they correctly envisaged the
risks of asset and debt deflation when the Nasdaq collapsed in March 2000.
Lower interest rates not only increased the lag between an equity market
crash and a property market crash, they also fueled the property market
bubble as portfolios shifted from equities to property. Nevertheless, in
spite of the presence of lower interest rates, which cushioned consumers
who were servicing their debts,a substantial fall in real personal disposable
income will ultimately trigger the collapse in property prices that will
characterize the next recession. Thus far, the equity markets have not
priced in the combined effects of a deep and protracted recession and a
simultaneous decline in property prices.
The method for evaluating equities that was outlined in the previous section
is not suitable for evaluating the dynamic relationship of the effects of a
recession and property market crash on the equilibrium value of the S&P
500; it is suitable only for a steady-state analysis. The dynamic relationship
between the equity and property markets has been formalized in a model of
the U.S. economy (Karakitsos 2002). This model was used to estimate the
effect of a double-dip recession and a property market crash on the equilib-
rium equity prices of the S&P 500 Index. The model used monthly data for
the February 1988 – March 2003 period and the E-Views computing pack-
age for estimation and simulation purposes.The properties of the model are
discussed later in this brief (see Sensitivity of Scenario I Simulation).
Public Policy Brief 14
Asset and Debt Deflation in the United StatesThe Impact of a Double-Dip Recession
Using the full macro and financial model in Karakitsos (2002), three sce-
narios were simulated to assess the likely impact of a double-dip recession
on the equilibrium value of the S&P 500: a deep recession and a severe
property market crash, a modest recession and a typical property market
crash, and a mild recession with no property market crash. The results of
these simulations are summarized in Table 1.
Scenario I: A Deep Recession and a Severe Property Market Crash
According to this scenario,real estate would fall by 25 percentage points of
personal disposable income (from 186 percent to 161 percent), and would
remain 8 percentage points higher than its 50-year historical mean (153
percent). The fall would be similar in magnitude to the 22-percentage-
point plunge in property prices that occurred in the first half of the 1990s.
The model suggests that net wealth would decline by 73 percentage points,
to 418 percent of personal disposable income, in little more than a year
after the shock in property prices (see Figure 5), and would approach the
all-time low, which occurred in 1974 (see Figure 1). The decline in net
wealth would be a multiple of the plunge in property prices,since it would
capture the effect of the fall in property prices on financial wealth.
A decline in net wealth would trigger a rise in the saving ratio when con-
sumers realized that the fall in equity prices would be permanent, lost
hope of a recovery,and attempted to pay back their debts.According to the
model, the saving ratio would rise to 8.4 percent of disposable income in
little more than a year after the shock in property prices (see Figure 6).The
relationship between net wealth and saving would be crucial because it
describes the way in which the personal balance sheet would return to
equilibrium after a serious imbalance.4As already shown in Figure 1,there
is a negative relationship between net wealth and the saving ratio.
In the 1950s and 1960s,when net wealth was higher than average,the saving
ratio fluctuated around its mean value of 10.5 percent of personal disposable
income. In the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, when wealth was below
its mean value,the saving ratio fluctuated around a higher mean value (11.8
percent).From the latter half of the 1980s to 2000,the saving ratio fell as net
wealth rose.Now,only a few months after net wealth peaked,the saving ratio
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
How Far Can Equity Prices Fall?Public Policy Brief 16



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
How Far Can Equity Prices Fall?





































































 Actual personal saving ratio
















































Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, Karakitsos (2002), and authors’calculations
Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, Karakitsos (2002), and authors’calculationshas begun, once again, to rise. Therefore, the model prediction that a rise in
the saving ratio from 3.5 percent to 8.4 percent would accompany a severe
property market crash of 25 percentage points is reasonable and of the same
relative magnitude as the early 1990s recession (when the saving ratio rose
from 7.2 percent to 11.4 percent).
A rise in the saving ratio would deepen the recession, as previous support
of the economy from personal consumption dissipated. The macro model
suggests that the depth of the recession would reduce GDP by approxi-
mately 2.9 percent and industrial production by 7 percent. Investment in
equipment and software would plunge by 9 percent (see Figure 7) and cor-
porate profits would fall by 23 percent (see Figure 8), figures similar to the
2001 recession.The dollar is forecast to depreciate 30 percent from its mid
2002 value. In spite of the huge increase in liquidity engendered by the
Federal Reserve, the growth rate of the money supply would decline to 5
percent as the commercial banks’deteriorating balance sheets forced them
to cut lending, thus creating a credit crunch. Inflation would fall to zero.
The average price-earnings ratio of the stocks in the S&P 500 would fall to
18.7 (its mean value for the past 20 years),while dividend yields would rise
Public Policy Brief 18
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Figure 7  Real Nonresidential Investment in Equipment and Software 





































Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’calculationsto their mean value of 3.2 percent. Credit risk would remain at its current
high level (3.25 percent). The 10-year Treasury Note yield would rise to
4.58 percent in spite of the recession, as a result of the depreciation of the
dollar and the deteriorating federal deficit. Under this scenario, the S&P
500 equilibrium value is estimated to fall to 600.
Sensitivity of Scenario I Simulation
The plausibility of the first scenario depends on the sensitivity of the equi-
librium value of the S&P 500 to its determinants. The results of a sensitiv-
ity analysis are shown in Table 1. For the purposes of comparison, each
determinant was perturbed (drastically changed) by 50 percent of its
value. However, since a standardized perturbation may be implausible for
some determinants, the results in Table 1 may seem counterintuitive. For
example, corporate profits have a smaller effect than the exchange rate. In
order to foster an appreciation of the results of the sensitivity analysis,this
brief proceeds to outline certain aspects of the model.
The many variables affecting the equilibrium value of the S&P 500 can be
combined into two groups: current and expected corporate profits, and
the equity risk premium.The effect of current corporate profits is small:A
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
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Sources: NIPA, Flow of Funds, and authors’calculations50-percent improvement, which is well within the normal range, lifts the
equilibrium S&P 500 value by only 1.8 percent.The effect of expected cor-
porate profits,which are captured by the exchange rate,industrial produc-
tion, investment, and inflation, is more important than current profits.
The exchange rate indirectly captures the effect of expected corporate
profits,since dollar depreciation leads to higher corporate profits (in terms
of repatriated profits for U.S. subsidiaries located outside the United
States) and increased competitiveness (in terms of higher exports, lower
imports, and higher profits for domestic companies). A fall in the dollar,
therefore, raises the equilibrium value of the S&P 500.
The model property of a negative relationship between the exchange rate
of the dollar and the equilibrium S&P 500 Index should be contrasted with
the market view of a positive relationship.The difference between the model
and the market belief reflects the difference between a partial and total
derivative of the model.The negative relationship reflects the partial deriva-
tive of the model (what would happen to the S&P 500 if the exchange rate
depreciates, all other things being equal) whereas the market view reflects
the total derivative of the model (what would happen if the other variables
are allowed to change simultaneously).
In the first scenario, a dollar depreciation of 30 percent is necessary for
corporate earnings to recover. Such a huge depreciation may seem para-
doxical, but it is necessary for a profit recovery. The market’s view that a
strong dollar is associated with a strong equity market stems from the rela-
tionship between the equity market and the growth of GDP. A rally in the
equity markets raises the net wealth of the private sector and leads to
higher growth in the economy as a result of increased consumption,which
does not require dollar depreciation.Similarly,the effect of industrial pro-
duction captures the effect of future corporate profits. An increase in
industrial production leads to expectations of rising profits and to a higher
S&P 500.
More inflation also leads to higher corporate earnings.It does so by raising
the pricing power of companies and by reducing the opportunity cost of
holding equities (higher inflation lowers the real interest rate and the
return on money, which is a substitute for equities). More investment in
equipment and software also leads to higher corporate earnings by
increasing the growth rate of the economy.
Public Policy Brief 20
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model,the equity risk premium is estimated using the yield gap,excess equity
return, credit risk, and yield curve (the spread between the long bond yield
and the three-month Treasury Bill rate). Credit risk is the most important
determinant of the equity risk premium. A 1-percentage-point fall in credit
risk, which is very plausible in terms of actual fluctuations, leads to approxi-
mately an 11.5-percent increase in the equilibrium value of the S&P 500.
The sensitivity analysis shows that there are only three important factors
that influence the equilibrium value of the S&P 500: the exchange rate,
industrial production,and credit risk.A reasonable move in the currency,of
about 10 percent,would have a limited effect on the S&P 500,so a huge dol-
lar depreciation would be necessary for higher profitability and for the econ-
omy to recover. If industrial production were to fall by half, which is well
within the normal range, then the equilibrium S&P 500 would improve by
10 percent.As noted above, a 1-percentage-point fall in credit risk raises the
equilibrium S&P 500 by 11.5 percent. In the first scenario, credit risk does
not fall from its current level.It seems unreasonable,however,to assume that
if the economy plunges into another recession,credit risk will abate.Rather,
it most likely would rise, so the equilibrium value of the S&P 500 would be
even lower. The overall sensitivity analysis suggests that the equilibrium
value of the S&P 500 is approximately 600,plus or minus 10 percent.
Scenario II:A Modest Recession and Typical Property Market Crash
The preceding sensitivity analysis, while useful in showing the robustness
of the first scenario with respect to its determinants, is only a partial equi-
librium analysis,because it is based on partial rather than total derivatives.
The following alternative scenarios,because they are based on total deriva-
tives, complement the sensitivity analysis.
The alternative scenario of a modest recession and a typical property mar-
ket crash would lead to an equilibrium value,for the S&P 500,of 675,a 13-
percent improvement.In this scenario,the property market crash would be
approximately 15 percentage points, a figure typical of real estate declines
in the 1960s and 1980s.In the 1980s,the drop in property prices was caused
by high interest rates that made mortgage debt servicing very difficult. In
the early-1990s recession,real estate fell approximately 22 percentage points,
which is similar to the first scenario. The second scenario can, therefore,
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
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cushion the property market crash, thereby creating a situation in which
net wealth would fall to 443 percent of disposable income rather than to the
418 percent predicted in the first scenario. The modest recession (GDP
declines by 2.1 percent) would be deeper than the early-1990s recession,but
shallower than the recessions in the 1970s and 1980s.A critical factor in this
second scenario is that credit risk would fall by a 0.5 percentage point com-
pared with its current value. If this fall did not materialize, the S&P 500
would be 623,an improvement of only 4 percent over the first scenario.
Scenario III:A Mild Recession and No Property Market Crash
In this scenario, the recession would be so mild that there would be no
property market crash. The recession would be caused by corporate sector
weakness with no investment recovery. The personal component of the
private sector would suffer as its real disposable income weakened, owing
to  fewer jobs and lower wages. The personal component would not
retrench,however,because the effects of the mild recession would be offset
by lower interest rates. It is assumed that the recession would be half as
deep as the recession in the early 1990s, thereby avoiding a property mar-
ket crash. It is estimated that the equilibrium value of the S&P 500 would
be 805, an improvement of 34 percent over the first scenario.
Credit risk would decline by 1 percentage point compared with the first
scenario and a 0.5 percentage point compared with the second scenario. If
credit risk were to fall by only a 0.5 percentage point, then the S&P 500
would decline to 720,an improvement of 20 percent over the first scenario.
However, some of the beneficial effects of the lower credit risk would be
negated by a decrease in dollar depreciation.
Summary and Conclusions
Using quarterly data and the long-run (steady-state) personal balance
sheet, the S&P 500 is estimated to be fairly valued at 810 by the end of
2002. Using monthly data and a different approach that emphasizes cur-
rent and expected earnings as well as the equity risk premium,the S&P 500
is estimated to be fairly valued at 901. At the peak of the bubble, the S&P
500 was overvalued by 122 percent. Three years of falling equity prices,
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however, have eliminated any overvaluation and the S&P 500 was slightly
undervalued several times during the course of 2002.
The equity markets may move to lower levels in the next two years.For exam-
ple, investors hoping for an economic recovery in the second half of 2002
have simply postponed their expectation. In addition, the markets have not
priced in the possibility of a double-dip recession or a property market crash.
A double-dip recession could occur in two ways:
1. Despite the end of the Iraq war, the economy fails to recover and goes
straight into recession.
2. The economy experiences a cyclical upturn lasting, possibly, until the
end of 2004 (after the presidential elections) and then falls into reces-
sion in 2005. Imbalances in the economy result in a jobless recovery
with very low investment (Arestis and Karakitsos 2003a, 2003b).
How far can equity prices fall in the event of a double-dip recession within
the next two years? In the first, most likely, scenario, recession would  trig-
ger a severe property crash of approximately 25 percentage points of per-
sonal disposable income and the S&P 500 would fall to 600. This means
that there could be a 33-percent drop (from 901) in equity prices this year
or in 2005. Although this drop appears excessive, it is based on neutral
rather than pessimistic assumptions.
A sensitivity analysis shows that the critical factors underlying these con-
clusions are the depth of the recession,the exchange rate of the dollar,and
credit risk.The dollar is assumed to depreciate 30 percent from its value in
mid 2002.If that assumption did not materialize,the fair value of the S&P
500 would drop to 526, because dollar depreciation is deemed essential to
increased profitability and economic recovery.It is assumed that credit risk
would remain at its current high level of 3.25 percent. This assumption is
reasonable,since it is difficult to justify the lowering of credit risk during a
deep recession. A sensitivity analysis of the first scenario, based on these
assumptions,shows that the fair value of the S&P 500 is 600,plus or minus
10 percent.
The overall conclusion is that the U.S. economy and, by implication, the
world economy may not have seen the worst yet, in terms of recession.
Under certain conditions, a double-dip recession is highly probable.
How Far Can Equity Prices Fall?Notes
1. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, there were many recessions
caused by asset and debt deflation. Most notable are the “tulipmania,”
which occurred in the middle of the 17th century, and the Mississippi
and South Seas bubbles of the early 18th century (Garber 2000).
2. A variable is stationary if its mean and standard deviation do not
change over time. Net wealth as a percentage of disposable income is
a stationary variable, since it is the difference of two nonstationary
variables of order one.
3. In an earlier working paper, the peak of the Internet bubble was
located as occurring in March 2000, which coincides with the burst-
ing of the Nasdaq bubble. However, the extensive July 2002 revision
of NIPA data, back to 1999, accounts for the transfer of the peak to
an earlier quarter and for other differences between this brief and
Working Paper no. 368. It should be noted that although such revi-
sions amount to rewriting history, they reflect the discrepancy between
data available as events unfolded and the more realistic figures that
became available later.
4. The relationship between net wealth and the saving ratio describes
the stationarity condition of the personal balance sheet.
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